Category Archives: Migration

Inferring Minister’s assertion he has had ‘regard to’ material was just ‘mere verbal formulae’

In Carrascalao v Minister [2014] FCAFC 107 the Court inferred that the Minister did not actually consider the material he was obliged to, before making his formulaic decision. The judgment discusses two cases in which the evidence showed that the Minister had at most about half an hour to consider hundreds of pages of material, which of course, he would not have done in that time.

The error was failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the cases. The Full Court explained:

129. … 43 minutes represents an insufficient time for the Minister to have engaged in the active intellectual process which the law required of him in respect of both the cases which were before him.

The Minister was also the subject of a Jones v Dunkel inference arising from the failure of one of the central characters, his Chief of Staff, to give any evidence:

130. Seventhly, the inferences which we have drawn from the material above in concluding that the Minister did not engage in the requisite active intellectual process, is reinforced by the fact that neither he nor his Chief of Staff gave evidence. Accordingly, we would apply the principle in Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298 which, we note, was also applied in the particular circumstances in the Douglas case at 61-62 and in other judicial review cases referred to therein. As the Full Court observed in the Douglas case at 62:

The application of the rule requires… that there be inferences available from the evidence which favour the other party. The failure of the Minister to call evidence does not provide positive evidence that he did not consider the representation but, unexplained, it leaves the Court in a position where opposing inferences can be more confidently drawn because they stand uncontradicted by the person who could say something about the true state of the facts: Jones v Dunkel at 308. The question then is what inferences were open on the evidence.

131. In considering whether the rule of evidence in Jones v Dunkel applies here, we have taken into account the multiple statements made by the Minister in his statement of reasons to the effect that he had considered, noted, accepted, recognised or had regard to various matters, as well as the concluding statement which appears in both statements of reasons that the Minister had “given full consideration to all of the information before me in this case” (emphasis added). The Minister may subjectively have believed these matters, including his claim to have given full consideration to all the information before him in both cases but, for the reasons set out above, we do not consider that his subjective belief is determinative when, for the reasons given above, the Minister did not have sufficient time to engage in the active intellectual process required by law before deciding to cancel the two visas.

 

 

Documents covered by invalid s 438 certificates might demonstrate denial of procedural fairness or apprehended bias

MZAFZ is not dead yet. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194  at [86] the Full Court confirmed the possibility that an applicant might want to (and be entitled to) demand production of documents covered by an invalid s 438 certificate, because those documents might show denial of procedural fairness or apprehended bias.

‘Exceptional circumstances’ is not limited to whether the applicant could have provided the information earlier

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958 concerned the IAA’s exclusion of information on the sole basis that the applicant could have but did not provide it to the delegate. White J said at [46]-[47] this was an unduly narrow interpretation of ‘exceptional circumstances’.

His Honour stated:

[41] Generally, consideration of whether exceptional circumstances exist will require consideration of all the relevant circumstances. That is because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination the circumstances may be such as reasonably to be regarded as exceptional…

[43] … exceptional circumstances will be those which are out of the ordinary course and which will justify the new information being considered even though it had not been provided to the Minister at the time of the s 65 decision. A variety of matters may be capable of bearing upon those circumstances. (emphasis added)

His Honour also observed at [34]-[35] that the requirements in s 473DD(a) and (b) overlap, so that even though they are cumulative, the fact that information could have been provided to the delegate earlier but was not cannot be decisive. Thus, information that could have been provided earlier but was not (s 473DD(b)(i)) might nonetheless be personal information that had it been known, would have affected the decision (s 473DD(b)(ii)), and in light of that significance (or otherwise), there was an ‘exceptional’ circumstance (s 473DD(a)).

His Honour’s reasoning was endorsed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176 at [102]-[112].

The Full Court left open the possibility that the IAA failing to consider a particular piece of information in deciding whether there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ may constitute jurisdictional error: [114].

Failure of judge to give adequate reasons

This can be a failure to exercise jurisdiction. See COZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 46 at [31]-[56] and DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Proteciton [2018] FCAFC 2.

In COZ16, after setting out the principles, Griffiths J said:

[47] In my respectful view, for the following reasons there has been a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction in this case.  First, the brevity of the primary judge’s substantive reasoning for rejecting the two grounds of judicial review has already been noted.  The primary judge explained in six short sentences in [50] and [51] as to why ground 1 was rejected (see [15] above).  The primary judge’s reasons for rejecting ground 2 are set out in [53] of his Honour’s reasons for judgment.  In both instances, the primary judge’s reasons amount to little more than assertions or conclusions.  In particular, in respect of ground 1, the primary judge found that the IAA had taken into account the siblings’ suspected links to the LTTE.  His Honour said that this matter had been expressly taken into account in the IAA’s reasons “as summarised above”.  No specific cross-reference was given to any particular part of the IAA’s reasons for decision which the primary judge considered supported his conclusions.  In particular, no specific cross-reference is given for his Honour’s conclusions that:

(a)          the IAA took into account the appellant’s siblings’ suspected links to the LTTE; and

(b)          there was no failure by the IAA to consider the familial connection of the appellant to his siblings.

[48] These difficulties are not overcome by the fact that in [37] of the IAA’s reasons for decision it stated that it had considered the appellant’s circumstances “in their totality”.  It seems, however, that the primary judge viewed this statement as determinative (see [51] of his Honour’s reasons).  Whether in fact the IAA considered the appellant’s circumstances in their totality fell to be determined not by a mere assertion to that effect by the IAA, but by a careful objective analysis of the IAA’s reasons and the relationship of those reasons to the claims and submissions advanced before it by the appellant.  The primary judge conducted no such analysis or evaluation and simply accepted and acted upon the IAA’s bald assertion. 

[49] Similar difficulties are presented by the inadequacy of the primary judge’s reasons for rejecting ground 2.  In [52] of his Honour’s reasons for judgment, the primary judge referred to the IAA’s identification of the appellant’s mother as a person who had complained to the HRC, yet she and other members of her family continued to reside in Sri Lanka in the absence of any harm during the period since the appellant left Sri Lanka.  His Honour then said at [53] that the IAA’s adverse reasoning “was open on the material and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification”.  As the Full Court observed in DAO16 at [48], to simply state that adverse findings were open and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification is merely to assert a conclusion.

[50] As to the appellant’s complaint that the IAA failed to give adequate reasons as to why he was not at risk, the primary judge referred at [53] to the significance which the IAA attached to the appellant’s release and its finding that he suffered no harm from the interrogations.  Reference was also made to the IAA’s findings that neither the mother nor other members of the appellant’s family been harmed since he left Sri Lanka.  What is missing from the primary judge’s reasons, however, is any attempt to address the appellant’s reliance on the Guidelines, or the significance of his uncontested evidence that his siblings were still missing. 

[51] Nor does the primary judge adequately explain why he did not accept the significance in the appellant’s case of his claim that he had been threatened in August 2012 with the same fate if he were to continue to complain to the authorities about their disappearance.  This threat, which the IAA found had been made, arguably put the appellant in a different position from his mother.  It is possible that the primary judge had this claim in mind in [53] of his reasons for judgment and the reference there to the appellant having “suffered no harm in relation to the interrogations that then subsequently took place…”.  But it is far from clear that this is what his Honour had in mind, bearing in mind that the appellant’s complaint was not that he had suffered harm in relation to the August 2012 interrogation, but rather that he was threatened with harm on that occasion if he persisted with his complaints concerning his siblings’ disappearance.  This ambiguity further exposes the inadequacy of the primary judge’s reasons. 

[52] These matters were relied upon by the appellant before the IAA.  They were also prominent in his judicial review challenge before the FCCA.  In my respectful view, the matters had to be directly addressed by the primary judge, but they were not.  Both the appellant and any reader of his Honour’s reasons for judgment is left to speculate as to why these matters were not viewed to be relevant and significant, and arguably provided some support for the appellant’s judicial review challenge. 

[53] Secondly, and related to the first matter, the primary judge never grappled directly with important elements of the appellant’s primary claim.  That claim was that the IAA fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider the risk to the appellant by virtue of his imputed links to the LTTE by reason of his family association with the two missing siblings.  At the forefront of this claim the appellant relied on three paragraphs in the Guidelines which identified “risk profiles”, in particular sub-paragraph 6.  The primary judge made no reference at all to the Guidelines.  Nor did he explain why the appellant’s reliance on them was misconceived.

[54] It may well be that there is an adequate explanation as to why the Guidelines did not apply.  But, if that is so, it is not evident from a fair reading of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment.  The appellant (and, indeed, any other reader of the reasons) is simply left to speculate as to why relevant parts of the Guidelines, which the appellant squarely raised before both the IAA and the primary judge, did not indicate that he had a risk profile.  The primary judge found that the IAA had taken into account the siblings’ suspected links to the LTTE and also that it did not fail to consider the familial connection.  But, as noted above, the primary judge made no express cross-reference to any part of the IAA’s reasons for decision to underpin these assertions.  One rhetorically asks whether his Honour had in mind the IAA’s reasons at [10] and/or [13] of its reasons for decision.  If so, a related question arises as to how these paragraphs provide an adequate response to the appellant’s claims.  It was an important part of his case that, in spite of all of the reforms which have taken place in Sri Lanka in recent years, his two siblings remained missing and that he was threatened with the same fate if he continued to complain about their disappearance.

[55] It goes without saying that these ambiguities and shortcomings in the primary judge’s reasons for judgment are not resolved by reference to what was said in the transcript.  Reasons for judgment should speak for themselves.  They are directed not only to the parties but to the community at large who will not have easy access to the transcript.

[56] It is proper to acknowledge that the FCCA’s migration jurisdiction is a high volume and challenging jurisdiction.  Equally, however, it must be recognised that that Court is exercising an important judicial review jurisdiction and litigants are entitled to expect that the well-established features of the judicial process will be provided.  Those features include not only the requirements of procedural fairness, but also that the Court will provide adequate reasons for its decision and properly address fundamental aspects of the parties’ respective cases.  Depending on the circumstances of any case, including the detail and complexity of the submissions which are made, it may be appropriate to provide relatively brief reasons for rejecting a party’s case.  It may also be appropriate in some cases for the Court to deliver ex tempore reasons for decision, but this does not mean that the Court is somehow excused by that method of decision-making from adequately disclosing the Court’s reasoning processes, having regard to the general principles and considerations outlined in [32]-[46] above.

 

 

The concept of an “integer”

See MZANX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 314 FLR 461 (reversed on appeal for different reasons):

[25]  Surprisingly little judicial attention has been devoted to the concept of an “integer” of a claim, as that phrase was coined in Htun. That may explain why in 2013 Robertson J in SZRKT took the view that the authorities illuminated no clear distinction between “claims” on the one hand and “mere” items of evidence on the other. The phrase “integer” seems to have been used interchangeably with “component of claim” (Htun) yet in Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Kiefel, RD Nicholson and Downes JJ) the opportunity for exposition was not taken up as the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia merely stated that the tribunal was “required to deal with all integers of an applicant’s claim”, without providing elucidation about what an integer was. His Honour Judge Manousaridis has held that an “integer” may be taken to be the equivalent of a material question of fact. His Honour so held in SZURJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection that an integer was a meaningful subset of material questions of fact, which, in combination with other meaningful subsets of material questions of fact, ought to lead the Tribunal to conclude in a particular way. In my respectful view, his Honour’s consideration of the subject is accurate. It appears to be one of the only statements of principle on point. The sheer volume of decided migration cases in the federal jurisdiction over the last 10 years has overtaken observations in learned writings of the early millennium of which an example is Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life After S157’. So far as my research has uncovered, the consideration given to the subject of integers by his Honour Judge Manousaridis is the best and only treatment on the point.

MZANX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION BC201608646

Tribunal still required to consider cases not expressly articulated

See eg NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263:

The Tribunal is required to deal with the case raised by the material or evidence before it – Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 157 at 180 [114] (Merkel J). There is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal is not to limit its determination to the ‘case’ articulated by an applicant if evidence and material which it accepts raise a case not articulated – Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 at 63 (Merkel J); approved in Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at 293 – 294 (Wilcox and Madgwick JJ). By way of example, if a claim of apprehended persecution is based upon membership of a particular social group the Tribunal may be required in its review function to consider a group definition open on the facts but not expressly advanced by the applicant – Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 184 at 196 per Merkel J, Heerey and Sundberg JJ agreeing. It has been suggested that the unarticulated claim must be raised ‘squarely’ on the material available to the Tribunal before it has a statutory duty to consider it – SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 265 at 273 [19] per Cooper J. The use of the adverb ‘squarely’ does not convey any precise standard but it indicates that a claim not expressly advanced will attract the review obligation of the Tribunal when it is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal. (see [58])

Findings of fact apparently based on credibility cannot shield what is otherwise incontrovertible

A tribunal of fact cannot insulate its fact-finding by asserting that it is all based on credibility. This obvious proposition was explained in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118:

[28] Over more than a century, this Court, and courts like it, have given instruction on how to resolve the dichotomy between the foregoing appellate obligations and appellate restraint. From time to time, by reference to considerations particular to each case, different emphasis appears in such reasons. However, the mere fact that a trial judge necessarily reached a conclusion favouring the witnesses of one party over those of another does not, and cannot, prevent the performance by a court of appeal of the functions imposed on it by statute. In particular cases incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony will demonstrate that the trial judge’s conclusions are erroneous, even when they appear to be, or are stated to be, based on credibility findings.

[29] That this is so is demonstrated in several recent decisions of this Court. In some, quite rare, cases, although the facts fall short of being “incontrovertible”, an appellate conclusion may be reached that the decision at trial is “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” in the case. In such circumstances, the appellate court is not relieved of its statutory functions by the fact that the trial judge has, expressly or implicitly, reached a conclusion influenced by an opinion concerning the credibility of witnesses. In such a case, making all due allowances for the advantages available to the trial judge, the appellate court must “not shrink from giving effect to” its own conclusion. Finality in litigation is highly desirable. Litigation beyond a trial is costly and usually upsetting. But in every appeal by way of rehearing, a judgment of the appellate court is required both on the facts and the law. It is not forbidden (nor in the face of the statutory requirement could it be) by ritual incantation about witness credibility, nor by judicial reference to the desirability of finality in litigation or reminders of the general advantages of the trial over the appellate process.

(footnotes omitted)

Don’t analyse ‘real chance’ by numbers

See Mansfield J in DZADQ v Minister for Immigration (2014) 143 ALD 659 at [65]:

The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant was as a Shia Muslim at risk of serious harm by reason of his religion. The Tribunal however classified that risk as being too remote. In my view, the essential link in the chain of reasoning connecting the two findings was missing. Besides quoting that there are over 40 million Shia Muslims in Pakistan, the Tribunal, in its published reasons, did not consider the evidence that underpinned its ultimate finding that the risk was remote. In my view, its task was not done by the numerical analysis. It should have considered the appellants’ particular circumstances. If it be the case that there is nothing to distinguish the appellant from other Shia Muslims in Pakistan, provided the country information (common to both the delegate and the Tribunal) stands, it is hard to see how the conclusion of the Tribunal is sustainable. If there were some small or local sectarian violence, the picture the country information indicated would not be so dramatic or compelling. To the contrary, the picture appears to be that it is coordinated, pervasive and effective, and the Taliban are presented as a cogent and broadly spread instrument of its application. It should not be adequate, in the face of such data, to say in effect that although a significant number of Shia Muslims will be severely harmed or killed by that pervasive targeted violence because you as a target group are numerous, the chances of any particular one of you being as harmed or killed is not a real one or is fanciful.

 

Apprehended bias and bowls of phở

The test and authorities discussing factual permutations are discussed by Kenny J in VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872.

It is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal member might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided.

A particularly outrageous example is found in S233 of 2002 [2004] FMCA 39. See for example:

[63] It is also noteworthy that on that same page, at about point nine, that the turn that emerges from the text of the Tribunal members’ questioning of the applicant is, to say the least unfortunate, bearing on the sarcastic and I quote:

How can they possibly distribute these dissident leaflets in parks and cafes? How can that possibly happen? Do they walk around to people having picnics and say ‘will you please read this’? Do they interrupt someone in the middle of bowl of pho and say ‘Oh excuse me, just while you are having your pho would you please read this pamphlet’.