If there was ever a need for authority for the proposition that what an applicant says or writes is still ‘evidence’, and that there is no legal requirement for evidence to be corroborated before it can be accepted (and the increasing trend in Tribunal and IAA decisions suggests there is such a need), see NAKD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs  FCAFC 321 per Hill J at .
In DTK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  FCAFC 170 there was discussion of whether a particular document was constructively before the delegate so as to render it not ‘new information’ for the purposes of the IAA. The impugned document was an ‘issues paper’ concerning Hazaras in Afghanistan. The Full Court held that such a document was not ‘before the Minister’ (or a s 65 delegate) such that it was not ‘new information’ for the purposes of the IAA.
It is notable that there appears not to have been any argument about the significance of s 499 (if the document was such a document which a s 499 direction required the delegate to consider). The Full Court’s rejection of the argument also does not answer the question of whether a document incorporated by reference in another document that was actually before the delegate, is itself constructively ‘before the Minister’ for the purposes of s 473DC.
The two limbs of s 473DD(b) are expressed as alternatives: CSR16 v Minister  FCA 474 at . Justice Bromberg there went on to conclude that “all that the ‘credible’ element of s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority’s satisfaction that the ‘new information’ is information which is open to be or capable of being accepted by the Authority as truthful (or accurate, or genuine)”:  FCA 474 at . “It is only at the deliberative stage of its review”, said his Honour, “that the Authority will be required to determine whether or not the ‘new information’ is true”.
A particularly egregious example of unreasonableness is Abboud v Minister  FCA 185 in which the Tribunal made arbitrary assumptions as to how a gay person ought to behave. The Tribunal has now on several occasions rejected persecution claims on the basis of sexuality through means of suggesting the applicant is involved in a gay ‘conspiracy theory’. Patently, such approach is unreasonable, irrational or demonstrative of failing to engage with the material before it. The entire Abboud decision is worth reading in order to expose the audacity of the Tribunal’s reasoning, but see especially -.
Frequently a decision-maker will leap to a conclusion that an applicant has been ‘inconsistent’ in his or her account. Frequently also, a decision-maker will bandy this label of ‘inconsistency’ incorrectly.
Often, in truth something may not be ‘inconsistent’. For example, the omission of making a particular claim at interview 1 does not mean it is an ‘inconsistency’ if raised in interview 2: see AVQ15 v Minister  FCAFC 133 at .
Also, just because there is an ‘inconsistency’ (assuming that word is used correctly), it does not follow that a credibility issue emerges. For example, a minor inconsistency cannot be transformed into a reason to disregard the whole of an applicant’s claims: see AVQ15 v Minister  FCAFC 133 at ; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT  FCA 317; 212 FCR 99 at .
Further, special attention needs to be given to the circumstances in which an applicant is giving evidence, before leaping to a conclusion of ‘inconsistency’ (or for that matter, adverse credit). Thus, if an applicant warns that he or she is only giving a ‘summary’ which is ‘not an exhaustive statement’ and will be giving more detail at a later stage, a failure to appreciate that qualification may create a jurisdictional error: see AVQ15 v Minister  FCAFC 133 at , , , .
The proposition that representations in relation to a s 501 cancellation attempt are not ‘mandatory relevant considerations’ is highly doubtful if not at least reductionist. See the discussion in Viane v Minister  FCAFC 116 per Rangiah J - and Colvin J at -. What matters is whether the relevant aspect which was not considered could amount to a ‘representation’, in which case it must be considered.
See also Hay v Minister  FCAFC 149 per Colvin J.
In AKK17 v Minister for Immigration (2017) 327 FLR 343 at - it was suggested that this might be an error depending on the nature of the document which the Secretary does not provide, notwithstanding the Secretary’s obligation under s 473CB(1)(b) to do so in respect of all documents before the delegate which were provided by the applicant.
Although inconsistent with the imperative language in s 473CB(1), it would appear that this decision is consistent with the requirement that an error have done kind of materiality in order for it to be a jurisdictional error (see eg Hossain v Minister for Immigration (2018) 92 ALJR 780).
- ‘exceptional circumstances’ means out of the ordinary, etc.
- Not possible to be prescriptive about the content of the term
- In determining ‘exceptional circumstances’, there is an overlap with the matters in s 473DD(b); both (i) and (ii) go towards the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’: 
- While s 473DD(b)(i) and (ii) are not ‘mandatory relevant considerations’ when assessing whether there are ‘exceptional circumstances’, the lack of reference to them and/or confining the consideration to other matters may demonstrate an incorrectly narrow understanding: -
- It is wrong to reason:
 The new information relates to material which was squarely an issue at the SHEV Interview on 4 December 2015. The substance of his protection claim rests on his claims that he has repeatedly been accused of, and interrogated about, LTTE membership and support and he has provided details of various other incidents in which he claims he was detained and interrogated about this. He was specifically asked about incidents of detention and torture during the SHEV Interview and he responded with descriptions of those incidents. Given these factors, and the fact that he was represented and had been residing in Australia for three years by the time he was questioned by the delegate, I do not accept his explanation that the was afraid he would be suspected of being returned on account of being perceived as an LTTE member.
 The applicant also claims he was previously too embarrassed to disclose the incident to either the delegate or his representative. While I accept if these events occurred it would be natural for the applicant to experience feelings of embarrassment and shame and that that may impede his willingness to recall and discuss the details, I do not consider this as an explanation as to why he previously made no mention of being detained for two days in July 2012. I consider he need not have provided intimate details about the torture to make the delegate aware that he had been detained and interrogated as recently as one month before he left Sri Lanka. Given he disclosed various other similar incidents with basic detail I do not accept he would not have mentioned that the event occurred, even if he did not wish to discuss the finer details.
 I do not accept there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the information.
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16  FCAFC 176
- BVZ16 is correct: 
- In particular, the IAA demonstrates a wrongly narrow understanding of ‘exceptional circumstances’ if it only considers only whether an explanation for why the ‘new information’ was not provided earlier: -
- Thus, (on nothing more than an application of BVZ16) it is incorrect to reason:
This information was not before the delegate at the time of the s 65 decision, and is ‘new information’. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister on 29 September 2015. At the beginning of the protection visa interview the applicant confirmed there was nothing in his application form which was false or misleading. He also stated, ‘I do not have anything more or less to add.’ He also made an affirmation confirming all his claims for protection were true. At the end of the protection visa interview the applicant was asked if he had put forward all his claims for protection to which he responded, ‘yes’. He was also asked if there was anything else he wanted to tell the delegate, to which he responded, ‘no’. During the protection visa interview, the applicant was also put on notice in regard to raising all claims for protection to the delegate. He was given information in the protection visa interview in respect to the limitations of providing new information if his protection visa application was refused and referred to the IAA for review. On the evidence before me the applicant has not mentioned his membership of association to AFLA or any other political organisation. The applicant has never claimed to have participated in any political protects either in Iran or Australia. The applicant’s claims of joining AFLA, playing for a [football] team in Sydney, his parents being questioned as a result of his involvement with the [football] team and participating in political rallies are all stated to have occurred prior the delegate’s decisions being made on 17 February 2016. The applicant has not provided any explanation as to why the information could not have been provided earlier. I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information provided by the applicant.
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  FCAFC 192
- The IAA errs in construing ‘exceptional circumstances’ if it does not “address itself to whether the material was credible personal information or information of such a character which was not previously known to the Minister and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the appellants’ claims”: 
- Thus, it is incorrect to reason:
The applicant was interviewed in relation to his claims for protection on 28 October 2015 with a registered migration agent present. During this interview the applicant was provided the opportunity to present all his claims for protection. At the end of the interview the delegate provided the applicant an opportunity to submit any further detail to his claims for protection. The delegate also provided the applicant’s representative an opportunity to provide a written submission which was submitted to the delegate on 11 November 2015. During the interview the applicant was explained (sic) the importance of providing all his claims for protection as early as possible. The applicant was also represented by a registered migration agent who was provided through the Department’s Primary Application Information Service (PAIS). A decision was made on 9 June 2016. This new information relates to events which occurred prior to the primary decision being made. I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information.
- It may that a proper construction of s 473DD means it is possible for there to be ‘exceptional circumstances’ even if neither of s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii) are made out: 
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  FCAFC 111
- This decision is difficult to reconcile with the other authorities. At  the Court effectively concludes that the IAA only needs to take into account what is expressly put before it by the applicant in determining whether there are ‘exceptional circumstances’. Also implicit in the Court’s reasoning is that it will never be enough to argue that the rejected new information may have potentially have caused a different assessment of the other matters before the delegate–but this is surely inconsistent with BVZ16, BBS16 and s 473DD(b)(ii).
In Carrascalao v Minister  FCAFC 107 the Court inferred that the Minister did not actually consider the material he was obliged to, before making his formulaic decision. The judgment discusses two cases in which the evidence showed that the Minister had at most about half an hour to consider hundreds of pages of material, which of course, he would not have done in that time.
The error was failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the cases. The Full Court explained:
129. … 43 minutes represents an insufficient time for the Minister to have engaged in the active intellectual process which the law required of him in respect of both the cases which were before him.
The Minister was also the subject of a Jones v Dunkel inference arising from the failure of one of the central characters, his Chief of Staff, to give any evidence:
130. Seventhly, the inferences which we have drawn from the material above in concluding that the Minister did not engage in the requisite active intellectual process, is reinforced by the fact that neither he nor his Chief of Staff gave evidence. Accordingly, we would apply the principle in Jones v Dunkel  HCA 8; 101 CLR 298 which, we note, was also applied in the particular circumstances in the Douglas case at 61-62 and in other judicial review cases referred to therein. As the Full Court observed in the Douglas case at 62:
The application of the rule requires… that there be inferences available from the evidence which favour the other party. The failure of the Minister to call evidence does not provide positive evidence that he did not consider the representation but, unexplained, it leaves the Court in a position where opposing inferences can be more confidently drawn because they stand uncontradicted by the person who could say something about the true state of the facts: Jones v Dunkel at 308. The question then is what inferences were open on the evidence.
131. In considering whether the rule of evidence in Jones v Dunkel applies here, we have taken into account the multiple statements made by the Minister in his statement of reasons to the effect that he had considered, noted, accepted, recognised or had regard to various matters, as well as the concluding statement which appears in both statements of reasons that the Minister had “given full consideration to all of the information before me in this case” (emphasis added). The Minister may subjectively have believed these matters, including his claim to have given full consideration to all the information before him in both cases but, for the reasons set out above, we do not consider that his subjective belief is determinative when, for the reasons given above, the Minister did not have sufficient time to engage in the active intellectual process required by law before deciding to cancel the two visas.
MZAFZ is not dead yet. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15  FCAFC 194 at  the Full Court confirmed the possibility that an applicant might want to (and be entitled to) demand production of documents covered by an invalid s 438 certificate, because those documents might show denial of procedural fairness or apprehended bias.